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Abstract
Safety of machinery is the most critical issue in the de-
sign of mechatronic systems. The verification and val-
idation procedure for functional safety of machinery is
thoroughly discussed in ISO 13849-2. Following this
procedure, the system behavior in case of a component
failure has to be analyzed. Up to now this analysis
bases on expert knowledge and real experiments. In
this contribution a simulation based approach is pre-
sented. This approach has several advantages over the
state-of-the-art. First, real experiments are more time
consuming and costly than simulation. Moreover, ac-
cording models can be used for further investigations
like optimizing the sensor setup.
To enable failure simulation as a substitute of testing
on real machinery for validation of functional safety,
typical hydraulic failures are added to safety-related
components of an in-house Modelica hydraulics li-
brary. This library is then used for the verification
and validation of functional safety of a hydraulic test
bench. Moreover, error propagation is considered.




Safety is of primary concern for all machine design-
ers. The functional safety of a mechatronic system is
assured by the correct execution of safety functions.
Those parts of the complete system that are relevant
for the execution of safety-functions are denoted as
safety-related part of the control system (SRP/CS).
ISO 13849 provides guidelines to assure safety of
mechatronic systems. While ISO 13849-1 [1] concen-
trates on the design of the SRP/CS, ISO 13849-2 [2]
focuses on the validation of functional safety. Thereby,
the reliability of the execution of a safety function is
evaluated by a discrete measure called performance
level (PL). The determination of the PL of a safety
function requires the analysis of the system behavior in
case of one or more component failures of the SRP/CS.
The failures that need to be considered for that analy-
sis are also standardized in ISO 13849. The PL is then
used to verify that a mechatronic system is functional
safe, by checking that the PL of the SRP/CS is greater
or equal to the required performance level (PLr ) of the
system. Obviously, the PLr has to be derived before-
hand from a risk assessment.
It is obviously desirable, that the validation of a safety
function can be done solely by analysis, using main-
stream failure analysis techniques like Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [3] or Fault Tree Anal-
ysis (FTA). However, in most industrial applications,
the SRP/CS of a safety function are too complex to an-
alyze the system behavior by the engineers intuition.
Hence, the result of these failure analysis techniques
is seldom conclusive. Consequently, testing on the real
system must be carried out in order to get a reliable re-
sult. For these tests usually a prototype of the SRP/CS
has to be constructed, which is a time consuming and
costly task. Furthermore, correct insertion of the de-
sired component failure into the test setup is not only
difficult, but can also damage the prototype, e.g. if
the influence of contaminated oil is investigated. In
some applications, testing on actual constructed sys-
tems might not even be possible, e.g. if the considered
failure leads to an hazardous situation for the opera-
tor. This is the case in hydraulic applications, when
the housing of a component breaks, because this leads
to an eruption of the oil at high pressure. To over-
come the same problems (costly and time consuming
prototypes), years ago simulation was established as a
development tool. The use of simulation for the ver-
ification and validation of requirements is visualized
in the mechatronic V-Model (see figure 1). However,
up to now the requirements were mostly functional re-
quirements. To the author’s knowledge there exists
no methodology to use simulation for the verification
and validation of functional safety with respect to ISO
13849. Consequently, there are no libraries available
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Modeling and model analysis
Figure 1: The mechatronic V-Model
that have a suitable level of detail, i.e. libraries includ-
ing failure models. Obviously, it is desirable to model
components including failures in such a way that
• the failures can be attached to a model without a
failure (the original model),
• modification of the original model does not re-
quire modifications of the failures,
• the different failures can be easily exchanged,
• new failures can be added.
According to the first requirement physical models are
needed. The remaining requirements aim for an object
oriented model. Thus, Modelica seems to be appropri-
ate to set up such models.
In this contribution an in-house hydraulics library is
extended by components with failures, where the fail-
ures are modeled according to the requirements men-
tioned before. On the basis of that library it is shown
how simulation can support and ease the design of a
functional safe system. Moreover, an approach for er-
ror propagation is presented. A hydraulic test bench,
which is used for testing hydraulic components like
valves, is used as an application example. To summa-
rize, the major benefits of the methodology presented
here are:
• Optimization the typical work flow of design with
respect to functional safety of mechatronic sys-
tems [4], i.e. replacing conventional analysis
techniques and tests on prototypes by failure-
simulation.
• Automated identification of the safety-critical
failures in the SRP/CS.
• Investigation of error propagation.
• Future: Possibility to determine whether a failure
can be detected by the sensor arrangements in the
SRP/CS.
1.2 State-of-the-art
The concept of functional safety is derived from a
functional system representation. Thus, most ap-
proaches for computer aided design of functional safe
systems use functional models. A functional model
is a block diagram of the system under consideration,
where the blocks represent functions of the model and
the connections represent a flow of energy, material or
signals. Functional models can be generated at very
early design stages, but suffer from the fact that they
are rather rough, e.g. they do not include any dynam-
ics.
Using these functional models, a Functional Failure
Identification and Propagation framework is proposed
for the analysis of functional failure propagation in [5].
However, this approach differs significantly from the
method shown here and suffers from two major draw-
backs. First, the level of detail of functional models is
very low. Thus, the value of the gathered information
is limited. Moreover, a special syntax and semantics
are developed, so that existing models can not be used
or upgraded for safety considerations. The same holds
the methods described in [6] and [7] since the authors
also use functional models. It is noteworthy, that the
approach presented by Deng is originally intended for
the verification of general requirements and can hence
also be used for the verification of functional safety.
Most functional model-based analysis approaches
are supported by failure analysis techniques like
FMEA or FTA. An approach for combining both is
presented in [8]. The coupling is done using the Sys-
tems Modeling language (SysML), a general-purpose
modeling language. This method allows for automatic
computation of a FMEA from a functional model, but
suffers from the drawbacks described above. The use
of ModelicaML [9] could be a promising future direc-
tion of the work presented here.
Although most simulation-based safety analysis
methods use functional models, examples of physi-
cal models used for safety investigation can be found.
A simple hydraulic system including a 4/3 direc-
tional valve, a motor-pump group and a cylinder is
modeled with the help of bond graphs in [10] for
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Figure 2: Determination of the required performance
level using the risk graph
proactive fault diagnosis. However, without the help
of powerful object-oriented equation-based modeling
languages like Modelica, even modeling this simple
hydraulic system is tedious and difficult. Therefore,
the fault diagnosis is restricted to erroneous spool
movement in the 4/3 directional valve. Moreover, this
method does not satisfy the requirements stated in the
motivation.
In the following section a brief introduction to func-
tional safety is given. After that, a hydraulic library
including models of failures is presented. Section 4
shows the application example mentioned before. The
paper closes with a conclusion and an outlook.
2 Functional safety
Safety is the primary concern for every machine
designer. ISO 12100 defines machine safety as:
“the ability of a machine to perform its intended
function(s) during its life cycle where risk has been
adequately reduced.”
If the machine safety depends on the correct
functioning of a control system, the termfunctional
safetyis used. ISO 13849 contains guidelines for the
design of a system with respect to functional safety.
In [4] ten steps to reach the required performance
level are presented. In the first step possible risks
are identified and evaluated in a risk assessment. If
required, measures to reduce the risks are chosen.
These measures can be information for the use of the
system, improved system design or safeguarding. If
such a measure depends on the control system it is
called asafety function. De-energizing of the system
in order to reach a safe state is a common safety
function. In the second step the safety functions of
the system are identified. In the third step the PLr is
determined for every safety function using the risk
graph in figure 2. In the shown example the possibility
of serious injuries (irreversible or death), that can
happen only in short time span (e.g. 10min per hour)
and are hard to avoid (e.g. fast moving machine)
lead to a required performance limit PLr =d. The
PLr quantifies the required reduction of the risk (see
figure 3). Hence, after the third step the requirements
for the SCRP/CS are known. Thus, in the fourth step
the structure of the control system can be outlined.
Following directive EN 954-1, control systems can
be realized in the form of five categories (B, 1, 2, 3,
4) mapping the typical architectures, e.g. redundancy
or additional shut-off paths. With each category
only certain performance levels can be reached as
can be seen in table 1. On the other hand, different
choices for the category in order to reach a certain
PL are possible. The fourth step is completed after
the selection of an appropriate category. In the fifth
step a functional model of the system is generated.
That model is used in the sixth step order to analyze
failures of the SCRP/CS. Therefore, a list of relevant
failures is included in [2]. Basing on the functional
model and the engineers expertise it is judged whether
the failures from the failure list lead to a dangerous
situation or the system remains in a safe state. Then,
for each component the diagnostic coverage (DC)
is determined as the ratio between failure rate of
detected dangerous failures and the failure rate of total
dangerous failures. Thereby, the failure rate is the
inverse of the mean-time-to-failure (MTTF), which
can usually requested for each component at the
manufacturer (MTTF and MTTFd). The MTTF is the
number of years at which approximately 63% would
fail. Hence, the MTTF corresponds to a statistical,
expected value and does not guarantee for a failure
free time. The sixth step is completed after calculating
the average diagnostic coverage for the complete







Table 1: Reachable performance level
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where MTTFd denotes the mean time to a dangerous
failure. In the seventh step the PL of the designed
SCRP/CS is determined. The PL depends on
• the category of the PLC,
• the reliability of the SCRP/CS (MTTFd),
• the diagnostic coverage (DCavg).
There exist different approaches to compute the
MTTFd of the SCRP/CS from the MTTFd of the single
components, e.g. Parts-Count-Procedure [4]. Using
the MTTFd, the category chosen in the fourth step and
DCavg determined in the sixth step, the PL can be read
from a table given in [4]. Afterwards, the robustness
of the PLC with respect to situations, that are not con-
sidered in the first steps, is analyzed in the eighth step.
For example, in a redundant controller design all chan-
nels could fail due to violation of the maximum admis-
sible operating temperature. In such cases adequate
measures are taken. In the ninth step the software for
the controller is developed with respect to state-of-the-
art techniques and processes. In the last step the re-
sults from the previous steps are verified and validated.
During the verification it is checked whether the re-
quired performance level has been reached. Otherwise
the SCRP/CS has to be improved, e.g. with compo-
nents with a longer life cycle or a higher category. The
plausibility of all the mentioned reliability parameters
(MTTFd, PL, category, DC), must be validated, either
by analysis or with the help of testing/simulation. The
complete validation procedure can be summarized as
follows:
1. validation of safety functions
2. validation of performance level which includes:
• validation of category specifications
• validation ofMTTFd andDCavg
• Validation of measures against systematic
failure
• validation of safety-related software
3. validation of combination and integration of all
SRP/CS
Theoretically, this verification and validation can be
performed solely by analysis. However, due to the
complexity of most control systems, testing or simula-
tion must be carried out to support inconclusive failure
analysis.
Besides the use of simulation for validation it is useful
for some other tasks. In the sixth step dangerous fail-
ures are identified. Up to now this is done basing on
a functional model and the engineers expertise. Due
to typically big and complex systems this approach is
time consuming and error prone. Hence, the use of
simulation would not only speed up the design pro-
cess, but also lead to more meaningful results.
3 Failure models in Modelica
The DC_HydrauLib is a Modelica library for the
simulation of hydraulic systems developed by Bosch
Rexroth. It contains hydraulic components like
pumps, cylinders and valves. In this contribution it
is used to present a possible approach for failure mod-
ling in Modelica. This approach respects the require-
ments stated in the introduction. Using the language
features of Modelica these requirements can be sat-
isfi d in the following way: Each failure is imple-
mented in a new model that extends from the nominal
model. All these models are then collected in a wrap-
per model (via replaceable), which is denoted as the
failure model. Modeling this way one failure model
consists of multiple models including failures. Dur-
ing application the user can choose the failure, that
should be investigated by a parameter. The failures are
implemented according to the list from ISO 13849-2
containing typical hydraulic failures. This list is de-
veloped without consideration of modeling and sim-
ulation. Hence, each failure is described on the base
of the actual component construction. Examples for
failures of a switching valve are
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• Change of switching times
• Non-Switching (sticking at the end or zero posi-
tion) or incomplete switching (sticking at a ran-
dom intermediate position)
• Spontaneous change of the initial switching posi-
tion (without an input signal)
• Leakage
• Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the
moving component(s) as well as breakage/ frac-
ture of the mounting or housing screws
However, the hydraulic library contains only models
with a level of detail suited for system simulation.
Thus, a translation into implementable descriptions fit-
ting to the abstraction level of the existing hydraulic
library is required first. While the translation for the
first two failures is straight forward, different transla-
tions for the remaining failures are possible, e.g.
• Spontaneous change of the initial switching po-
sition (without an input signal): A white noise
input signal replaces the control signal when the
failure is triggered.
• Leakage: Internal leakage with user-specified
leakage coefficient.
• Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the
moving component(s) as well as breakage/ frac-
ture of the mounting or housing screws: External
leakage with a (big) user-specified leakage coef-
ficient.
A brief overview on a possible implementation of the
failures is given below.
Change of switching times The switching behavior
of a switching valve is modeled by a trapezoidal pro-
file, that is parametrized by the switching times (on/off
separately). In addition to the parameters and variables
inherited from the base model, two new parameters,





ro f f =
T ′o f f
To f f
, (3)
where T and T ′ are the original and the erroneous
switching time of the valve, respectively. In case of
a failure the erroneous switching times are used in the
calculation of the spool dynamics.
Non-switching This failure is split into two failures,
non-switching and random sticking. Non-switching
means that the valve cannot open or close upon the
next opening or closing input signal. Thus, this fail-
ure does not take effect immediately at the moment
the failure is triggered. However, at the moment the
failure is triggered the current spool position is saved
and from that moment on used for the flow rate cal-
culation instead of the spool position calculated in the
spool dynamics.
Random sticking, takes effect when the failure type is
triggered, which means that the spool stays at the cur-
rent position when the failure is activated at any ran-
dom time. The sticking position can either be the two
end positions or any intermediate position. This failure
is very common in directional valves, when the spring
holding the spool at the end position is broken. The
implementation is very similar to the non-switching
behavior.
Spontaneous position change This failure de-
scribes the situation when the valve becomes totally
uncontrollable, most likely due to breakage of the
spool. For this failure, a white noise generator pro-
ducing filtered noise with a user-specified bandwidth
is used as the input for the spool dynamics. Notice
that this noise generator is not really random. Only
different seeds generate different noise output.
Leakage Leakage is an unavoidable problem in the
construction of hydraulic valves. Leakage between
two hydraulic ports is models as a volume flow rate
proportional to the pressure difference∆p between the
two ports
q = c·∆p (4)
with c as the leakage coefficient. Here, one has to
distinguish between internal and external leakage.
Internal leakage takes place between the two hydraulic
ports of a the valve. In the example of a switching
valve with two ports (A and B), oil might flow
from port_A to port_B, even when the valve is fully
closed. External leakage is leakage to the environment
(modeled as a tank). This model can also be used
to simulate the breaking of the housing or similar
failures.
Looking at the failures it is clear that there should
be some kind of triggering mechanism. In this
work two different triggering mechanisms have
been implemented. In the first case the failure is
Session 3B: Fault Handling and Safety Issues in Modelica
DOI
10.3384/ECP14096455
Proceedings of the 10th International ModelicaConference
March 10-12, 2014, Lund, Sweden
459
Control blocks
PLC program in IndraWorks
Test table



























Figure 4: Hydraulic test bench
triggered at a user specified time. In the second
case the failure is triggered by the violation of the
working conditions of the corresponding component,
e.g. pressure limitation, temperature range or fluid
contamination. In this contribution only one working
condition (pressure limits) is implemented. According
to the specifications of the DC_HydrauLib, both
ambient and fluid temperature are constant during
one simulation run, so exceeding the temperature
range cannot be modeled using that library (until
now). Similarly, fluid quality is also a fixed property
of a selected oil type, thus contamination of oil can
also not be modeled. Though, the user can specify a
maximal operating pressure. If this maximal pressure
is exceeded the chosen failure is triggered.
4 Application Example
In this section a test bench for hydraulic valves is used
to present possibilities of the usage of failure simula-
tion during the design phase of a hydraulic system. A
typical safety function of this test bench (emergency
stop initiated by user), is thoroughly investigated by
simulation on the SRP/CS that executes this safety
function.
4.1 Test bench
The hydraulic test bench (Figure 4) is designed for the
testing of directional valves. The test bench is manu-
factured by Bosch Rexroth and applied in the produc-
tion line of a Rexroth plant. Typical valve character-
istics of the test item (specimen in figure 4) like leak-
age, characteristics curves and switching times can be
tested. To perform all tests required for a test item,
the test bench must be able to provide various pres-
sure and volume flow rates. During the productive
period of the test bench, a trained operator stands in
front of the test table to mount the test item. A test can
only be started when the safety door (protective safe-
guard in figure 4) is open. On the other hand this door
can only be lowered when the test item is correctly
mounted. The test results are automatically recorded
by the control devices of the test bench. Thereby, the
test results can be severely impaired by a malfunction
of the test bench, especially by component failures in
the motor-pump group and the test table. For exam-
ple, internal leakage inside the test bench may lead
to test results, that indicate too big leakage of the test
item. Moreover, if one of the safety functions, which
are measures against risks, cannot be carried out due
to internal component failures, the consequence can
be even more disastrous. Thus, each time before the
test bench is started a checking routine has to be per-
formed. To reduce this non-productive period, and at
the same time ensure the correct functioning of safety
functions like emergency stop and safe door locking,
is one of the most challenging issues in the designing
of hydraulic test benches.
4.2 Circuit example
The safety function to be investigated for the hydraulic
test bench (emergency stop initiated by user), is acti-
vated by pressing the emergency button on the con-
trol panel, and executed by de-energizing all engaged
valves. Notice that in the execution of this safety
function only the relevant actuators, namely valves
engaged in cutting off the pressure supply, are de-
energized. The energy supplier (the electrical motor
within the motor-pump group) is still working, be-
cause it might be employed in other crucial functions
of the test bench.
Two functional blocks exist between the oil pres-
sure supply and the test table, where the test item is
mounted. The block directly below the base frame of
test table is the measurement block, which contains
mainly sensors for measuring and valves for channel
selection. This measurement block is designed to carry
out all important tests on the test item. Notwithstand-
ing its importance in the correct functioning of the test
bench, it is not safety-related, since it does not execute
a safety function. Moreover, malfunction of this mea-
surement block only results in the non-execution of the
designed tests on the test item. No danger is caused by
th loss or degradation of this function. So the mea-
surement block is out of the investigation scope of this
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Figure 5: Simplified circuit diagram
contribution.
The other block is directly connected to the pressure
supply. This block is designed to cut off the oil sup-
ply from the pump as fast as possible by de-energizing
all engaged valves upon emergency. So this functional
block is the active part to execute the safety function
under consideration, and thus in the focus of the in-
vestigation in this contribution. The original system
consists of several identical channels that can be con-
nected to the test item. However, for the following in-
vestigations only one channel is considered for the rea-
son of simplicity. Some additional simplifications lead
to the circuit diagram in figure 5. Here, the red com-
ponents (valve VA1, VB1, VA2 and VB2) are failure
models. An explanation of the essential components is
given in the following:
• VA1 and VA2: These 2/2 directional valves con-
trol the pressure supply of the test table. The
valves have a switching time of 10ms and an
internal induction sensor for spool monitoring
(high DC value).
• VB1 and VB2: These 2/2 directional valves are
opened in order to let the remaining oil between
two valves flow back to the tank. The valves have
a switching time of 10ms.
• VD1: This pressure relief valve limits the pres-
sure in the circuit to 250bar.
• V3: This 2/2 switching valve imitates a test item.













































Figure 6: Spool position of the valves in the reference
simulation
4.3 Failure simulation
Before performing failure simulations, a failure-free
simulation is first carried out as a reference behavior.
During this reference simulation the safety function
is triggered twice within five seconds. Thereby, the
motor-pump group provides a constant volume flow
rate of 40 l/min. Figure 6 shows the spool positiony of
all controlled valves (VA1, VB1, VA2, VB2 and V3).
The safety function is triggered at 1s and 3s, respec-
tively. Thus, at these times the valves VA1 and VA2
are de-energized (closed). Moreover, VB1 and VB2
also de-energized (opened) and thus let the residue oil
flow back to the tank. Valve V3, which represents
the test item, is controlled by a separate testing sig-
nal, and is not engaged in the execution of the safety
function. It opens at 0.15 s and stays completely open
throughout the whole simulation. The volume flow
rate into the test itemqV3 is the output variable since
this variable is a measure for the danger of extrud-
ing oil. The volume flow rate into each major (VA1,
VA2, VB1, VB2 and V3) is shown in figure 7. Valve
VB1 and VB2 are auxiliary valves designed to let out
residue flow when the main channel is suddenly cut
off. Hence, the flow rate trough these valves is much
smaller than the flow rate through VA1 and VA2.
The results of the reference simulation is used as
the reference for all failure simulations performed in
the following.
4.3.1 Time triggered failures
In the first step described in Sec. 2 a risk assessment
is performed. Here, simulation with failures injected
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Figure 7: Volume flow rate at port_A of all controlled
valves in the reference simulation





















































Figure 8: Comparison of four failure simulations with
the reference simulation
into only one of the safety-related components (VA1,
VA2, VB1 and VB2) can be used in order to get better
estimates of the consequences of component failures.
In the sixth step it judged whether a failure leads to
dangerous situation or not. Clearly, also here simula-
tion can be used. However, here the use of simulation
in the tenth step is shown, i.e. how to use simulation
for validation. Therefore, the category of the SRP/CS
is validated in the following. The chosen category for
the system at hand is three (PLr=d). According to ISO
13849-2 this requires that a single failure does not lead
to the loss of the safety function. Therefore, a Dymola
script is used to simulate possible single failures. In
figure 8 some typical results are presented. The trajec-
tories under investigation are the system outputqV3,
which is the volume flow rate into the test item valve
V3, and all measurable states, which are the displays
of the two pressure sensors S1, S2 and the two internal
sensors monitoring the spool position for valve VA1
and VA2. Sensor S1 is placed near the pump, and is
used to monitor the pressure source of the whole sys-
tem. Sensor S2 is placed at the inlet port of the test
item valve V3, and is used to monitor the pressure pro-
vided to the test item.
It can be easily seen that the trajectories ofqV3 and
the two pressure sensor displays in the four test cases
in figure 8 differ from the reference trajectories around
0.5s (valve VA1 and VA2 are opened). However, after
the first triggering of the safety function at 1s,qV3 be-
comes almost identical to the reference trajectory for
each test case. The same holds for all test cases not
shown here. Thus, the safety function is successfully
executed in all the four test cases and the safety func-
tion is not lost in case of a single failure.
Note that the validation of the category can thus be
performed only based on simulation, which saves time
and money (especially for more complex systems).
Clearly, during the risk assessment also combinations
of failures can be simulated.
4.4 Error propagation
For the previous simulations, only time-triggered fail-
ures are considered. Another option for the failure
triggering mechanism, in which a component failure
is activated when a safety principle is violated, is con-
sidered in this section, for the investigation of error
propagation.
Therefore, the failure-free pressure relief valve VD1
in figure 5, which is used for pressure limitation of
the whole system, is replaced by an equivalent failure
model. Note that the failure lists for pressure valves
differs from the failure list for directional valves. The
only investigated failure in this contribution is non-
opening, which means that the valve cannot open com-
pletely (maximal 1%).
In the test case for error propagation the failure of
the valve VD1 is triggered at 1s. Additionally, VA1 be-
comes uncontrollable (spontaneous spool movement),
if the pressure at the inlet port exceeds the pressure
limit of 400bar. The other valves (VA2, VB1 and
VB2) exhibit a big external leakage (corresponds to
the breaking of the housing), if the pressure limit
(same as for VA1) is exceeded. Once again, a simu-
lation of five seconds with two requests on the safety
function is performed (denoted as Testcase 1 in the fig-
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Figure 9: Results of the valve VA1 compared with the
reference simulation
ures). In figure 9 the simulation results for valve VA1
are shown. It can be seen that the valve VA1 breaks
down shortly (at 1.01s) after the failure of valve VD1
is triggered, because the pressure at the input port gets
bigger than the pressure limit. From that time on the
spool moves uncontrolled, which results in the pre-
sented volume flow. The valves VA2 and VB1 break
down simultaneously shortly after the break-down of
valve VA1 at 1.13s. This is, because the inlet ports of
these two valves are connected to the same hydraulic
port. The break-down of the valves VA2 and VB1
is modeled as big external leakage and hence these
valves nearly act a tank for the rest of the simulation.
That behavior explains the simulation results of the
valve V3 (shown in figure 10). It can be seen that the
volume flow after the failure of VA2 is much smaller
than in the reference simulation. Note that the valve
VB2 works properly, which indicates that the pressure
at the end connector to the test item does not exceeds
the maximum allowed pressure. This can also be con-
firmed by a look at the pressure sensor S2, which is
even lower as in the reference simulation. This behav-
ior occurs, because the valves VB1 and VA2, which
are nearer to the pressure supply, break down earlier
(and exhibit a big external leakage as explained be-
fore).
This example shows that it is possible to perform a
model based estimation of the consequences of com-
ponent failures, where even error propagation is con-
sidered.






































Figure 10: Results of the valves V3 and VD1 com-
pared with the reference simulation
5 Summary
In this contribution an approach for the use of simu-
lation for the verification and validation of functional
safety is presented. Therefore, a hydraulics library is
extended by failure models. Thereby, the failure mod-
els depend on the original model in such a way, that
the requirements stated in the introduction are satis-
fied. One possible use of these failure models is a
risk assessment. The simulation of single failures lead
to insight in the consequences of component failures.
Here, also error propagation can be considered. Fur-
thermore, the failure models can be used for the veri-
fication and validation step, e.g. the verification of the
category as shown before.
In the future, optimization will be used for the iden-
tification of the worst case combination of failures.
The results can either be used for the risk assessment
or the identification of critical components. Moreover,
the approach can be used in order to identify an op-
timal sensor setup. Therefore, on the one hand better
sensor models have to been implemented and on the
other hand algorithms for failure identification are re-
quired.
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